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MATTEL INC. V. WALKING MT. PRODS.
353 F.3D 792 (9TH CIR. 2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
Mattel Inc. filed an action in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California against artist Thomas Forsythe
(a.k.a. Walking Mountain Productions), alleging that Forsythe's
"Food Chain Barbie" photographic series infringed Mattel's
copyrights, trademarks, and trade dress.1  Forsythe moved for
summary judgment in the district court.2  The court granted
Forsythe's motion and held that Forsythe's use of Mattel's
copyrighted work was a fair use and that his use of Mattel's
trademark and trade dress caused no likelihood of confusion as to
Mattel's sponsorship of the works.' Furthermore, the court
dismissed Mattel's trademark dilution claim because it found
Forsythe's use of Mattel's trademark to be noncommercial.4
Mattel appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment.'
Forsythe cross-appealed the district court's order denying him
attorney's fees and costs under the Copyright and Lanham Acts.6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to Forsythe as to Mattel's
copyright, trademark, trade dress infringement, and dilution
1. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003).
Other issues were discussed in this case. Mattel Inc. also appealed: the Los
Angeles federal district court's dismissal of its false advertising claim; the San
Francisco federal district court's order quashing the discovery subpoena that
Mattel served on SFMOMA (a non-party to this action); and the court's order
requiring Mattel to pay attorney's fees to the SFMOMA's counsel. These issues
however, are not the focus of this summary as they do not pertain to an art or
entertainment issue.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 797.
6. Id.
1
Drexler: Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods. 353 F.3D 792 (9TH CIR. 2003)
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART. & ENT. LAW [Vol. XV: 433
claims.7 On cross-appeal, the court vacated and remanded the
district court's decision to deny Forsythe's attorney's fees under
the Copyright and Lanham Acts.8
II. BACKGROUND
This case resulted from a dispute between Mattel, owner of the
"Barbie" copyright, and Thomas Forsythe, a self-taught artist,
regarding his photographic series "Food Chain Barbie" which
depicts nude Barbie dolls in provocative positions.9
In creating the works of the series at issue, Forsythe
incorporated "Barbie" into the titles and juxtaposed the nude doll
with kitchen appliances. 0 For example, in "Malted Barbie" a nude
Barbie was placed on a vintage Hamilton Beach Malt Machine, in
"Fondue a la Barbie" Barbie heads were mounted on fondue sticks
in a fondue pot, and in "Barbie Enchiladas" Barbie was wrapped in
a tortilla and coated in salsa inside a casserole dish."
Forsythe's artistic works often have social and political
overtones. 2  Forsythe claimed the message behind this
photographic series was an attempt to critique the objectification
of women associated with Barbie, and to lambast the conventional
beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects. 3
He explained that he chose to parody Barbie because he believed
she was the "most enduring of those products that feed on the
insecurities of our beauty and perfection-obsessed culture." 4 He
believed his message was serious with an element of humor. 5
Forsythe's market success with the series at issue was limited. 6
7. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 817.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 796.
10. Id.
It. Id.
12. Id.
13. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 796.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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His work was displayed at two art festivals, one in Utah and
another in Missouri.' 7 Some works were chosen for display in
various exhibitions in the west, and even at the Guggenheim in
New York. 8
Forsythe promoted his artwork through a postcard, a business
card, and a website."9 Only 500 of 2,000 promotional postcards,
depicting "Barbie Enchiladas," were ever distributed; some
throughout his hometown and some to a feminist scholar who used
the works in academic presentations. 20  He sold 180 of his
postcards to a friend who owned a bookstore in his hometown, and
sold an additional 22 postcards to two other friends. Prior to the
lawsuit, Forsythe had only received four or five unsolicited calls
inquiring about his work. 2' Forsythe produced about one thousand
business cards with a depiction of one of his works, "Champagne
Barbie," handing them out at art fairs and as introductions to
22gallery owners. Forsythe also had a website on which he
depicted low resolution pictures of his photographs, described his
artistic mission, and provided a link to his biography.23 The
photos were not configured for on-line purchasing. 24 The "Food
Chain Barbie" series earned him a total gross income of
$3,659.00.25 Purchases by Mattel investigators constituted about
half of Forsythe's total sales.26
17. Id.
18. Id. at 797 n.2.
19. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 797.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 797.
26. Id. at n.3.
2005] 435
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Copyright Infringement
The first issue before the court was whether the district court
erred in granting Forsythe's motion for summary judgment on
Mattel's claim for copyright infringement. 7 While agreeing with
the trial court that Mattel established a case of copyright
infringement against Forsythe, the court set out to determine
whether Forsythe's use was a fair one, protecting Forsythe from
damages. To do this the court weighed the facts, applying them to
the Copyright Act's fair use provision, 17 U.S.C. Section 107.
The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. 28
1. Purpose and character of use
The first factor considered by the court was the "purpose and
character of the use. ' 29 Under this factor the court determined the
extent to which Forsythe's work was transformative and not
supplanting of the original.3 ° Mattel argued that a reasonable jury
could conclude that Forsythe's works were not a parody as he
claimed them to be.3 Relying on a survey of the general public,
Mattel asserted that only some individuals perceived a parodic
character. 32
27. Id. at 799.
28. Id. at 800.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 801.
32. Id. at 802.
436 [Vol. XV: 433
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol15/iss2/8
MATTEL INC. V. WALKING MT PRODS.
The court disagreed and found that Mattel had established
Barbie as "the ideal American woman" and a "symbol of
American girlhood" for many. " Forsythe's photographs "tum[ed]
this image on its head," literally and symbolically, through
ridiculous poses.34 His lighting, background, props, and camera
angles served to create a context that transformed Barbie's
message.35 The photographs presented the viewer with a different
set of associations and contexts for Barbie.36
In some of Forsythe's photos, Barbie was about to be destroyed
or harmed by domestic life in the form of kitchen appliances, yet
she continued to display her well-known smile, disturbingly
oblivious to her predicament."7  As portrayed in some of
Forsythe's photographs, the appliances were substantial and
overwhelming, while Barbie looked defenseless.38  In other
photographs, Forsythe conveyed a sexualized perspective of
Barbie by showing the nude doll in sexually-suggestive contexts.39
The court found it was not difficult to see the social commentary
that Forsythe intended.4" By transforming traditional associations
of Mattel's Barbie doll, the court concluded that Forsythe created
the sort of social criticism and parodic speech protected by the
First Amendment and promoted by the Copyright Act.4'
Therefore, the court found the transformative factor weighed
heavily in favor of Forsythe.42
The next element that the court considered under the "purpose
and character of the use" factor of Section 107 was whether the
work's purpose was commercial or whether it had a non-profit
aim.43 While Forsythe certainly had a commercial expectation for
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 803.
42. Id.
43. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803.
2005]
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his art, the court did not weigh this heavily against him because the
series was extremely transformative and parodic in character. 4
2. Nature of the copyrighted work
The second factor considered by the court in the Section 107 fair
use analysis was the nature of Mattel's copyrighted work. 45 The
court accepted that Barbie is a creative work and that creative
works are intended greater copyright protection than informational
and functional ones.46 However the court stated that creative
works are often the subject of fair use parodies. 47 While stating
that the factor is not terribly significant in the overall balancing of
fair use, the court concluded that the factor might weigh slightly
against Forsythe.48
3. Amount and substantiality of the portion used
The third factor considered by the court was whether the
substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work that was used
in Forsythe's series in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole
was reasonable.49 Mattel argued that Forsythe used the entirety of
its copyrighted work, and that Forsythe could have used less of the
Barbie figure, for example, by limiting the photos to Barbie's
head."
The court rejected Mattel's argument.51 First, the court found
that Forsythe did not copy the work verbatim, which would have
been an exact three dimensional reproduction. 2 The court also
44. Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994),
recognizing that the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of the other factors).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803.
50. Id.
51. id.
52. Id.
438
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found that Forsythe did not display the entire Barbie figure in his
photos because parts were obscured or omitted depending on the
composition of the photographs. 3
Second, the court rejected Mattel's argument that Forsythe could
have taken a lesser portion of its work. 4 The court found that
copyright infringement actions generally involve songs, videos, or
written works." These works are naturally severable, and a new
work can easily use portions of the original and add to it." Here,
because the copyrighted material was unique - a doll design - and
the infringing work was a photograph containing that doll,
Forsythe, short of severing the doll, must add to it by creating a
context around it and capturing that context in a photograph.57 For
the court's purposes, Forsythe's use was no different from a
parodist taking a basic melody and adding elements that transform
the work. 8
The court found that in both Forsythe's use of the entire doll and
dismembered portions of the doll, portions of the old work were
incorporated into the new work, but the sum emerged with a
different character. 9 Therefore, the court found that this factor
weighed in favor of Forsythe because parodic works need not take
the absolute minimum amount of the copyrighted work possible,
and the extent of Forsythe's copying of the Barbie figure and its
parts was justifiable in light of his parodic purpose and the
medium used.6
4. Effect of the use upon potential market
The fourth factor the court considered was whether there was
actual market harm to Mattel as a result of Forsythe's use of
53. Id. at 804.
54. Id.
55. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 804.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
20051 439
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Barbie and whether this outweighed the benefit the public would
derive if the use was permitted.6 Mattel argued that Forsythe's
works could lead to market harm by impairing the value of Barbie
itself, Barbie derivatives, and licenses for the use of Barbie.62 The
court rejected Mattel's argument because the works at issue were
parodies, and it was highly unlikely that such works would
substitute for products in Mattel's markets.63
Furthermore, the court found that Forsythe's photographs depict
nude and sexualized figures, and his works could only reasonably
be substituted for works in the market for adult-oriented
photographs of Barbie.64 The court found that Mattel was highly
unlikely to enter such a market or license others to do so.65
Similarly, the court rejected Mattel's argument that the works
would affect the market of Mattel's licensees because it was highly
unlikely that a copyright holder would license critical reviews of
their own productions.66
The court rejected Mattel's claim that Forsythe's works
impaired Barbie's value because a decrease in value of a
copyrighted work that may result from a particularly powerful
critical work is not recognized under Section 107.67 The court did
acknowledge, however, that critical works may have other
dimensions beyond their critical aspects that could have affect
potential markets for the copyrighted work.68
Having balanced the four Section 107 fair use factors, the court
held that Forsythe's work constituted fair use.69 His work was a
highly transformative parody of Barbie. 7' The amount of the
figure which he used in his works was permissible. 7' His
61. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 804.
62. Id. at 805.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
440 [Vol. XV: 433
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infringement had no discernable impact on Mattel's market.7 2
Finally, the benefits to the public in allowing such artistic freedom
and expression and criticism of a cultural icon are great.73
Allowing Forsythe's use serves the aims of the Copyright Act by
encouraging the very creativity and criticism that the Act
protects.74 The court concluded that Forsythe's use of Mattel's
copyrighted Barbie constituted fair use and affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.75
B. Trademark and Trade dress: Infringement and Dilution
The next issue addressed by the court was whether the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Forsythe on
Mattel's claims of trademark and trade dress infringement and
dilution under the Lanham Act.76 The first infringement issue
brought before the court was whether use of the plaintiff's
trademark was likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the two
products.77 Mattel argued an identical claim in previous litigation
against MCA records, producers of a song entitled "Barbie Girl,"
that the use caused confusion as to sponsorship." In Mattel v.
MCA, the Second Circuit rejected Mattel's likelihood of confusion
claim because of First Amendment concerns for free expression in
artistic works.79 Here, the court similarly found that Forsythe's
use of Barbie was clearly artistic expression: it was relevant to
Forsythe's work that the Barbie mark in the titles of his works and
on his website accurately described the subject of the photographs,
which in turn depicted Barbie and targeted the doll with Forsythe's
message. Also, the photographs' titles did not mislead as to
72. Id.
73. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 807.
78. Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
79. Id.
2005]
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Mattel's sponsorship of the works.8 °  The court therefore
concluded that the public interest in free artistic expression greatly
outweighed Mattel's interest in potential consumer confusion
regarding sponsorship of Forsythe's works.8" The court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment for Forsythe on Mattel's trademark
infringement claim. 82
The second infringement issue brought before the court was
whether Forsythe misappropriated Mattel's trade dress in Barbie's
appearance in violation of the Lanham Act.83 Mattel claimed that
it possessed a trade dress in the Superstar Barbie head and the
doll's overall appearance.84 The court found that Forsythe used
Mattel's Barbie figure and head in his works to conjure up
associations with Mattel, while at the same time using it to identify
his own work, which is a criticism and parody of Barbie.85 The
court looked at three elements to determine if Forsythe's use was a
nominative fair use: (1) whether Forsythe's works were not readily
identifiable without the trade dress, (2) whether only so much of
the Barbie doll was used in the work as was reasonably necessary
to identify Forsythe's works, and (3) whether Forsythe did nothing
that would, in conjunction with use of the Barbie doll, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by Mattel.86 As to the first element,
the court found that it would have been extremely difficult for
Forsythe to create a photographic parody of Barbie without
actually using the doll. Therefore, this prong was satisfied. 87
The court found that Forsythe also satisfied the second prong
because, given the photographic medium and Forsythe's goal of
representing the social implications of Barbie, including issues of
sexuality and body image, the use of Barbie's torso and head were
80. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 807.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 808.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 808.
87. Id. at 810-11.
442 [Vol. XV: 433
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both reasonable and necessary."
As to the third prong, Mattel attempted to argue that Forsythe
suggested sponsorship by asserting to potential customers that one
of the photographs "hangs on the wall of the office of Mattel's
President of Production to whom Forsythe referred to as 'Joe
Mattel."' 89  Forsythe claimed that he had no intention of
suggesting sponsorship and that his statement was meant in jest.
The court agreed.9"
The court held that Forsythe's use of Mattel's Barbie qualified
as a nominative fair use as all three elements weighed in favor of
Forsythe. The court found that it was necessary for Forsythe to
use Barbie for the work to be identifiable, that Forsythe used only
the portion necessary to make his parody identifiable, and that it
was highly unlikely that any reasonable consumer would have
believed Mattel sponsored the work. The court consequently
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Forsythe on Mattel's
trade dress infringement claim.
The third Lanham Act issue that the court addressed was
Mattel's appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment
on its trademark and trade dress dilution claim.9' The court held
that a dilution action only applies to purely commercial speech.92
In the case at hand, the court found that Forsythe's parody was a
form of non-commercial expression because it did more than
attempt to make a profit for the artist; it was an expression by
Forsythe of a social view.93 The court therefore rejected Mattel's
dilution claim under the Lanham Act and affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Forsythe.94
88. Id.
89. Id. at 812.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 812.
93. Id.
94. Id.
2005]
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C. Fees under the Copyright and Lanham Acts
The final issue considered by the court was whether the federal
district court correctly denied Forsythe attorney's fees under the
Copyright and Lanham Acts.95
1. Fees under the Copyright Act
Under the Copyright Act, the question in determining if a
defendant deserves fees and expenses is whether the successful
defense of the action furthered the purposes of the Copyright
Act.96 In denying the fee request, the district court concluded that
"[Forsythe did] not demonstrate that an award of fees and
expenses would further the purposes of the Copyright Act."97 The
court determined that the district court misstated the law, and
might have applied an incorrect legal analysis.98 The court held
that under the Copyright Act the correct question was "whether a
successful defense furthered the purposes of the Act, not whether a
fee award would do so." 99 The court vacated and remanded for
reconsideration of the issue of fees under the Copyright Act. 00
2. Fees under the Lanham Act
Under the Lanham Act, an award of fees is allowed in
"exceptional cases," such as those where "a plaintiffs case is
groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.'. °
Utilizing trademark and trade dress analysis, Forsythe's use
constituted nominative and fair use, and was protected by policy
interests of free expression.'02 As such the court found there was
95. Id. at 814.
96. Id. at 816.
97. Id.
98. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 816.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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an indication that Mattel's claims may have been groundless or
unreasonable.' °3 Because the court concluded that the district
court did not provide any reasoning for its determination, the court
vacated and remanded its denial of attorney's fees under the
Lanham Act."0
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the United States
District Court for the Central District of California's grant of
Forsythe's summary judgment motion as to Mattel's copyright,
trademark and trade dress infringement, and dilution claims."°5 On
cross-appeal, the court vacated and remanded the district court's
decision to deny Forsythe attorney's fees under the Copyright and
Lanham Acts.0 6 Forsythe's parody was fair use, and the facts of
the case supported at least a reasoned inquiry by the district court
as to an award to Forsythe of his attorney fees.
Dana Drexler
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 816.
106. Id.
20051 445
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